While much of the controversy over stem cell research today focuses on a single fundamental question When does human life begin? a number of other points of dispute exist. These points include questions such as complicity of researchers and legislators in the death of potential human lives for research purposes, maintaining “respect” for an embryo and other early living entities before birth, pursuing the promise of adult stem cell research, and recognizing and solving technical and other problems related to embryonic stem cell research.
Complicity
In a radio address on August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush explained that he would allow federal funding for stem cell research on certain existing embryonic stem cell lines that were already in existence. By this decision, he argued that the U.S. government would not be responsible for the destruction of human life (early stage embryos) for the purpose of conducting research, but such research could still continue. A number of theologians and philosophers pointed out what they saw as the flaw in that argument. According to the doctrine of complicity, government officials were guilty of cooperating in the murder of these embryos, they said, even if they did not take part in the actual act of destruction. The doctrine of complicity says that persons or institutions are guilty of a crime, even if they do not actually participate in the crime provided that they aid or abet that crime in some way.
Scholars often list four types of complicity. In the first case, one may actively participate in an immoral act, such as the destruction of an embryo, an entity that some would regard as a living human being. President Bush was certainly innocent of this type of complicity since he directed that the federal government not fund any research in which embryos are destroyed. The second type of complicity is more indirect. It occurs when a person provides support for some kind of immoral act, gives approval to or benefits from the act, or ignores the act. From this perspective, President Bush and researchers would be considered to be complicit with the murder of embryos since they knew about the destruction of the embryos, gave tacit support to the act by making use of the embryos in research, and, in some cases, benefitted financially or in some other way in the use of the embryos. A third type of complicity arises when one knows that an immoral act is about to occur and does nothing to prevent the act. Finally, a fourth type of complicity occurs when someone protects the perpetrator of an immoral act from the legal, moral, or other consequences of the act.
Clearly, the doctrine of complicity casts a very wide net among stem cell researchers. For those who agree with all four aspects of the doctrine, anyone who knows about, takes part in, benefits from, and/or does not act to prevent the destruction of an embryo is as guilty of the murder of the embryo for research purposes as the perpetrator of the act himself or herself. In brief, there is no moral justification for the destruction of any embryo under any circumstances. As one opponent of embryonic stem cell research has written:
“Even if NIH [National Institutes of Health] doesn’t grant funds to destroy human embryos, it is encouraging those who do by providing a venue for use of the stem cells. Even without the exchange of money, NIH is producing a “market” for those cells. Furthermore, moral complicity moves with the cells. That is to say, when NIH is standing with its arms outreached to receive embryonic stem cells from those who have destroyed embryos to obtain them, the moral guilt passes from one hand to the next. Those who destroyed the embryos are guilty of homicide (there’s nothing else to call it), and that guilt passes to those who knowingly use in their research cells obtained at the expense of embryonic life. The NIH guidelines, to put it quite bluntly, do no less than encourage and sanction the destruction of human embryos.”
Those who would encourage the use of embryonic stem cell research see the issue of complicity somewhat differently. In the first place, they may regard the embryo as a nonliving entity, so that the issue of murder or any other type of immoral act is simply not relevant here. Even if they agree that the embryo is alive, they suggest that researchers are guilty of a different type of complicity, something that ethicist John A. Robertson has called beneficial complicity. That term refers to the fact that the benefits achieved by using the fruits of an immoral act may be sufficiently great to excuse the person’s complicity. That is, if a researcher can bring relief to many people as a result of using embryonic stem cells, then his or her complicity in the destruction of the embryo from which those stem cells came is of less importance than the progress made. As one observer has written, “At some point, the doctrine of implied complicity in immoral acts must be replaced with reasoned compassion for the living.”
Thus far, as with so many other issues in the area of embryonic stem cell research, little progress has been made in resolving the differences among those concerned about the question of complicity in the use of embryonic stem cells.
Respect for the Embryo
Some people involved in the debate as to when human life begins have a somewhat easier position to state and defend: They say that life begins at conception, and that from that point on, whatever you call the evolving organism, it is as much a living human being as anyone who has already been born. It must be treated in precisely the same way as any living human being. People who argue that life begins at some later date, however, are confronted with the more difficult question as to how to treat the living, but not-yet-human, entity that develops from the zygote to the preimplantation embryo to the embryo to the fetus. With what kind of regard should scientists, legislators, and others view this on-the-way-to-becoming human?
The most common answer given to that question is to say that the growing entity does have the potential for life and it does possess certain qualities of humanness, even though it is not an individual human being. For this reason, these people say, the zygote and preimplantation embryo deserve respect. The phrase “the embryo deserves respect” occurs frequently in reports on stem cell research and the writings of both those who support SCR and those who oppose it. For example, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in its report on Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research concluded that “the embryo merits respect as a form of human life, but not the same level of respect accorded persons.”
The question, then, becomes what does the phrase really mean in a practical sense? Various scholars have given differing answers to this question.
The most common view seems to be that the preimplantation embryo deserves more respect than an inanimate object or a clump of living cells, but less respect than a fully formed human being. One should not, for example, buy and sell an embryo, the way one might buy or sell a piece of laboratory equipment. But showing respect to an embryo is still more complex. One exhaustive examination of this issue suggests that an important factor in showing respect to an embryo is to ensure that the research in which it is used will really provide sufficient benefit to justify the termination of the embryo’s survival. Another factor may be the viability of alternative methods of carrying out the research. Should adult stem cells eventually demonstrate their value as a substitute for embryonic stem cell in the development of medical therapies, then it would show respect to an embryo for it not to be destroyed for research. Also, the possibility of using the embryo for some other purpose, such as being adopted by an infertile couple, may override its use in an experiment, and respecting the embryo in that case would mean choosing adoption over experimentation.
For some scholars, the bottom line in the debate over respecting the embryo becomes, to some extent, a matter of terminology. When one acknowledges that a fully developed human being “deserves respect,” the term refers to a whole set of moral privileges due that person. But when one refers to the “respect” one gives an embryo, that term may have a more symbolic meaning, one in which we recognize the solemn value of humanness, but are willing to withhold a number of protections routinely afforded the fully formed human.
